A typology of cooperation strategies in the telecommunication industry: An exploratory analysis and theoretical foundations by Limbach, Felix et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Limbach, Felix; Wulf, Jochen; Zarnekow, Rüdiger; Düser, Michael
Conference Paper
A typology of cooperation strategies in the
telecommunication industry: An exploratory analysis
and theoretical foundations
22nd European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society
(ITS2011), Budapest, 18 - 21 September, 2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging
Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues
Provided in cooperation with:
International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
Suggested citation: Limbach, Felix; Wulf, Jochen; Zarnekow, Rüdiger; Düser, Michael
(2011) : A typology of cooperation strategies in the telecommunication industry: An
exploratory analysis and theoretical foundations, 22nd European Regional Conference of
the International Telecommunications Society (ITS2011), Budapest, 18 - 21 September,
2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/5217722
nd European Regional ITS Conference
Budapest, 18-21 September, 2011 
Felix Limbach, Jochen Wulf, Rüdiger Zarnekow, Michael Düser 
A typology of cooperation strategies in the telecommunication 
industry – An exploratory analysis and theoretical foundations 
Abstract: The value chain of the telecommunication industry is subject to a continuing 
disintegration which is caused by outsourced network operation, the provisioning of wholesale 
interfaces to competing service providers and the cooperative provisioning of broadband access. 
Thus, many companies regard cooperation as an element of cooperate strategy. In this paper we 
propose a cooperation topology for the telecommunication industry and identify drivers of 
cooperation based on the assessment of case studies. The results indicate that drivers of 
cooperation differ with respect to the cooperation direction and that the combination of 
complementary resources is the dominating driver of cooperation.     
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The telecommunication value chain of industrialized countries has been operated by fully 
integrated monopoly companies for many years. A series of deregulation activities has put 
end customers in the position to choose services from a number of providers. The 
resulting structural and technological changes in the telecommunications market require  
the reevaluation of business models within the entire value chain of the industry. 
Moreover, a steadily growing data demand requires investments in new infrastructures 
and technologies, which need to be implemented, maintained and operated considering 
financial restrictions. These preconditions contribute to a debate about  the establishment 
of cooperations within telecommunication industry. Some experts identify cooperation as 
the only feasible way for a market-driven establishment of Next-Generation-Networks 
(NGN) [Ge10]. However, every cooperation bears potential risks. This fact is reflected by 
a large number of NGN pilot projects and canceled cooperation within the 
telecommunication industry [Di09][Wi07][BB11].  
In the telecommunication market success is a matter of utilizing direct and indirect 
network effects which are particularly strong if cooperation interfaces are standardized 
[Ge05]. Thus, cooperation is often required in order to make a new service offer to the end 
customer. 
In order to facilitate the understanding of cooperation within the telecommunication 
industry we propose a topology of cooperation in telecommunications and discuss the 
theoretical foundations of cooperation. Moreover, we identify characteristics of 
cooperation within different layers of the telecommunication value chain.     
2. Cooperation theory 
2.1 Systematization of cooperation 
A cooperation can be defined as a medium or long-term collaboration of economically 
independent organizations [Pi03]. Moreover, a cooperation is voluntary and can generally 
be canceled by both companies at any time [Ge05]. This definition excludes 
collaborations which are based on governmental regulation. However, other authors 
propose definitions of cooperation without this confinement [DRCW96]. Due to the fact 
that the telecommunication industry is exposed to regulatory influences in most countries, 
we will include cooperation which is based on regulatory influences in our analysis. 
Collaborations between two or more organizations can be systemized in several ways. As 
proposed by [Mo05] cooperation can be classified according to the degree of mutual 
binding, duration, origin of the partners, cooperation subject, leadership structure and 
transaction form. In this paper we will systemize cooperation according to its direction as 
proposed by researches who have previously assessed the steps of value creation in the 
telecommunication industry [FrIR04][Ge05].
2.2 Transaction cost theory Transaction cost theory focuses on the analysis of transactions which can be defined as 
transfer of properties rights [Wi75][Wi91]. The organizational failure framework 
proposed by [Wi75] is based on the assumption that transactions differ with respect to 
frequency, uncertainty, ease of measurement and their asset specificity. The fourth 
property, asset specificity refers to the ease of redeploying an asset for an alternative use 
and represents a central transaction property for the employment of make-or-buy decisions 
[Wi75][Wi91]. 
Transaction costs occur during different phases of a transaction. Before a transaction is 
carried out it includes costs for purchase initiation (search, consulting, travel) and 
purchase (negotiation, legal settlement). Subsequently transaction costs involve   
deployment (process steering) and post-purchase (monitoring of quality and deadlines, 
adjustments) [LW02][Pi03]. Furthermore, transactions can be subject to hold-up 
opportunism and bound rationality. A hold-up referrers to a situation where two or more 
partners engage in a contractual relationship on the basis of incomplete information and an 
opportunistic nonowner can withhold assets ex-post from production  [Wi75]. Based on 
the assessment of transaction costs a company must decide whether to produce products
and services within the company, a cooperation or procure them from a market. In general 
a market procurement is advised when asset specificity is low as specialized suppliers may 
be able to realize economies of scale [LW02]. A market is characterized by autonomous 
adaption and few obligations between the parties of a nonspecific transaction [Wi91]. In
contrast a company hierarchy is advised if the asset specificity of a transaction is high. 
That is, steps of the value chain should be vertically integrated as the organizational 
instruments of an organization offer multiple instruments for dealing with asymmetric 
information and possibly resulting opportunism [Pi03]. Within the transaction cost theory 
a cooperation can be characterized as hybrid institutional arrangement in-between market 
and hierarchy. Thus, cooperation is advised if transactions are characterized by medium 
assed specify. Though a transaction’s asset specificity is an important indicator for the 
optimal institutional arrangement uncertainty and complexity also need to be considered. 
If these transaction parameters are high, a hierarchy may be the optimal institutional 
arrangement. Similarly a market is the optimal arrangement if the uncertainty and 
complexity are low.  
Subsequently medium uncertainty, complexity and asset specificity implies the setup up 
of a cooperation. Similarly it can be argued that a cooperation develops if partners want to 
retain the advantage of autonomous decisions, manage to share transaction specific 
investments and the consideration of uncertainty forecloses a market arrangement [Mé04].              
2.3Resource-dependence theory 
The resources-dependence theory is based on the idea that all organizations depend on 
resources which may be controlled or possessed by other organizations. Thus, 
organizations need to interact in order to acquire and maintain the resource mix necessary 
to survive [PS78]. The interaction of companies can either be of competitive, symbiotic or  
a combination of both [DRCW96]. Thus, companies need to become aware of these 
dependencies and have to decide if it is necessary to reduce the degree of external 
resource dependence. In order to assess dependencies a company must know to what 
percentage it depends on the resources of another organization and how critical these 
resources are for business success [PS78]. If a company identifies dependence on 
resources of another company it should assess to what extend this company is free to 
determine rules about the resource usage and if these resources can be procured from a 
different supplier [PS78][DRCW96]. Once the nature of the dependencies is known it may 
be necessary to reduce the dependence on external resources. If a cooperation partner is not substitutable due to its set of resources, depended companies are facing a problems 
similar to the hold-up situation know from transaction cost theory [BG04]. In general 
dependencies can be reduced by selecting different market niches, by internalizing 
dependency effects via mergers or by establishing linkages between organizations that 
reduce asymmetric information and insecurities [Se95][PS78]. 
The resource dependence approach assumes that organizations are particularly willing to 
establish a cooperation if resources are scarce and partners can improve their market 
position by bundling complementary resources. However, it can also be observed that a 
cooperation regulates the possession of important resources [Se95].
2.4Drivers of cooperation 
Based on findings from transaction cost and resource dependency theory [DRCW96] have 
identified drivers of cooperative relations. In this paper we use this findings as a 
qualitative indicator for the strength of a cooperation within different value added steps of 
the telecommunication industry. In general drivers of cooperation can be subdivided into 
external and internal drivers. Subsequently both categories will be explained.    
External drivers of cooperation 
External drivers of cooperation can be derived from the structural properties of an 
organization’s environment and influence the uncertainty of a company’s decision making 
[PS78]. Dowling et al. (1996) identify the external cooperation drivers: market 
concentration, scarce resources, regulation and global industries. Subsequently these 
drivers will be explained in detail. 
 Cooperative relationships are more likely in concentrated industries as large 
organizations exhibit more interfaces to potential cooperation partners than smaller 
companies.    
 An environment with scarce resources leads to more conflicts and dependencies 
between organizations than a munificence environment. In general scarce 
resources can be multifold in their nature. That is, they can refer to physical or 
financial resources and time constrains [WS05]. Increasing dependencies between 
organizations increase the likelihood in cooperative relations [DRCW96]. 
 Regulation can force organizations to cooperate. Many regulated 
telecommunication markets force incumbents to offer predefined products and 
services to competitors. Moreover, governmental invention can prevent 
organizations to expand to a different market. Thus, cooperation in network 
industries may be necessary in order to enable cross-network services for end 
customers [DRCW96].    
 Several authors have identified global presence as a driver of cooperative relations 
[Ho05][DRCEW96]. While two companies may be competitors in one country, it 
may to necessary to cooperate outside their home market.   
Internal drivers of cooperation 
Internal drivers of cooperation can be derived from company-specific properties and 
strategies [DRCW96][PS78]. However, external observers are limited in their ability 
to assess all internal reasons which lead to cooperative relations. Subsequently we will therefore focus on the assessment of internal cooperation drivers as proposed by 
[DRCW96].
 Cooperative relations between organizations are more likely if companies do 
not exhibit intersections in their core competencies [DRCW96]. Moreover, 
bundling of competencies represents the means to avoid conflicts [Ho05]. 
 The stability of a cooperation can be increased with congruent or 
complementary resources [AW09][Mo05]. The combination of resources
enables bundling of company strengths or the compensation of weaknesses. 
Congruent resource profiles enable cooperation that can lead to cost degression 
effects while complementary resources enable the improvement of the market 
position [Ho05].
 The acquisition of knowledge is another driver of cooperation. Research and 
development cooperation is common if knowledge acquisition is desired by 
several companies. Moreover, organizations can form a cooperation for the 
exchange of existing technology specific knowledge as this can improve the 
identification of new market opportunities [AW09].  
 Another internal driver of cooperation are common goals of organizations. This 
driver requires a trustworthy relationship between the partners and related 
cooperation is characterized by defined rules and processes aimed at 
minimizing opportunistic behavior [AW09].   
3 A cooperation topology for the telecommunication industry 
Cooperative relationships are established between economically independent 
organizations and can occur at different value added steps of the telecommunication value 
chain. The value chain of the telecommunication industry can be subdivided into three 
functional layers: Service, Network and Asset [FrIR04][Fr02]. 
The service layer ensures access to end customers and innovative developers for 
proprietary platforms. The development and marketing of new products creates value for 
end customers. Further value added steps at the service layer are billing and brand 
management.  
At the network layer companies create value through the provisioning of broadband 
access and by enabling data transport to backbone networks. Moreover, companies at this 
layer reduce costs by acquiring knowledge about network management and by optimizing 
processes.
At the asset layer companies provide and maintain the physical infrastructure that lays the 
foundations for the business models of companies at the network and the service layer. 
The product lifecycle of infrastructure at the asset layer is much longer than the lifecycle of products and services at other layers. Furthermore, high infrastructure investments costs 
are often ensuring a natural monopoly and stable margins. 
Figure 1 indicates that the three layers of the telecommunication value chain imply five 
cooperation interfaces.
Figure 1: Cooperation topology for the telecommunication industry 
In the subsequent section we introduce the methodology for the assessment of the 
cooperation interfaces. 
4 Assessment of cooperation interfaces 
3.1  Methodology 
In this paper we assess cooperation interfaces based on short case studies. In a first step 
we conduct a literature review in order to find examples of cooperation at different 
interfaces in the telecommunication industry. Subsequently only examples are 
incorporated into the analysis that can be clearly assigned to a single cooperation 
interface.
In the next step we assess the case studies according to the external and internal drivers of 
cooperation which were identified in section 2.4. In this process only those drivers of 
cooperation will be included in the analysis that can be clearly identified in the case study. 
The analysis will therefore not include undocumented reasons for cooperation and 
cooperation drivers that cannot be observed. In sections 3.2 to 3.6 we introduce cases 
studies for each cooperation interface.
3.2  Service-Service Cooperation 
The service layer is characterized by short product lifecycles and the utilization of positive 
network effects. Therefore, many examples can be found for the Service-Service   
cooperation (S-S) interface [Vo10][Na10][Ve10][Sp10]. One example for cooperation at 
this interface is the collaboration between Google and Vodafone during the introduction 
of a business cloud-service. Following [DRCW96] the market for cloud services cannot be 
classified as concentrated. Both companies are characterized by a world-wide presence 
and pursuit the common goal to offer attractive services to end customers. Both 
companies contribute complementary core competency and resources to this cooperation. 
Google contributes its knowledge about online document management to the cooperation 
while Vodafone offers direct access to many end customers [Vo10].  
3.3  Service-Network Cooperation In a Service –Network cooperation (S-N) the network of a service provider is operated by 
a network operator [Fr08]. Usually this network operator is specialized and also operates 
networks of other service providers. This enables the network operator to realize scale 
effects which can partially be passed on to the service provider. A service provider like 
Orange Austria can use such a cooperation in order to focus on its core competencies, the 
management of customer relations [Ge05][Al10a][Te10]. Furthermore, the service 
operator can reduce its costs for network operation.
Besides this example for voluntary cooperation, regulation based cooperation can be 
observed at the Service-Network interface. After the German regulation authority 
threatened Deutsche Telekom with regulatory measures in its VDSL-Network the German 
incumbent opened its network for competitors like for example 1 & 1 and Vodafone 
[He09]. In this type of cooperation Deutsche Telekom is providing a standardized 
Bitstream-Access to competing service providers. 
3.4  Network-Network cooperation 
Network operators maintain and operate the infrastructures which constitute the bases for 
the provisioning of end customer services [Ge05]. Besides the compliance with quality 
parameters, network operators put great effort into reducing the costs of network 
operation. Especially for small network operators Network-Network cooperation (N-N) 
can be useful in order to reach cost saving goals. T-Mobile UK and 3 UK have established 
a mobile network which they jointly operate in the UK. This cooperation pursues the 
objective to realize first-mover advantages in broadband mobile networks and to increase 
the joint market share [No10].      
3.5  Network-Asset cooperation 
Cooperation at the interface of the Network and the Asset layer (N-A) is characterized by 
a focus on core competencies and the realization of scale effects in network operations 
[Be05]. The owners of networks with few potential end customers can hardly assure the 
competitive operation of a network themselves. Therefore the network operation of the 
Digitalen Netzfunk für Sicherheitskräfte in Deutschland has been delegated to Alcatel-
Lucent [Al10b].
3.6  Asset-Asset cooperation 
Split investment costs and a high degree of operational freedom are characteristics of 
Asset-Asset cooperation (A - A) [Fr08]. Especially during the setup of capital intensive 
fiber optic networks several types of cooperation can be observed. In areas with high 
population density organizations can split up broadband deployments areas and ensure 
mutual access to the deployed network [Bu10].    
5 Cooperation interface analysis 
Table 1 contains the results of the case study analysis. The findings are subdivided into 
external and internal drivers of cooperation.






























































































































































































































































Google – Vodafone   [Vo10]  X X X X S-S
Navigon & T-Mobile   [Na10]        X    X    X 
Orange Austria & Alcatel-Lucent   [Al10a]  X      X  X  
Vodafone & Ericsson   [Te10]  X X X X
S-N
1 und 1 & Deutsche Telekom  [He09]      X           
T-Mobile & 3 UK  [No10]  X X X N-N
Telefónica & Vodafone  [Te09a] X  X   X  X  X X 
Alcatel-Lucent & Orange Schweiz   [Ac09]  X X X A-N
Alcatel-Lucent & Digitaler Funk   [Al10b]     XX      
Deutsche Telekom & EWE Tel  [Te09b]  X X A-A
Deutsche Telekom & France Telekom [He11]  X  X  X  X    X 
Table 1 shows that cooperation can be identified at all value added steps of the 
telecommunication value chain. Moreover, drivers of cooperation vary based on the 
observed case study and the associated value added step in the value chain. 
External drivers of cooperation: The analysis of the external drivers of cooperation shows 
that cooperation can be observed in either concentrated markets or in environments with 
many competing companies. The properties of the assessed cooperations do not a allow 
the conclusion that cooperation is more likely in concentrated markets between large 
companies. However, in concurrence with the findings of [Ge05] results show that capital 
intensive investments in infrastructure and its operation are a driver of cooperation in the 
telecommunication industry. Moreover, scarce resources are an important driver for 
horizontal cooperation. From this type of cooperation organizations often hope to gain 
sustainable competitive advantages and realize economies of scope [Ge05]. In the case of 
regulatory influences regulation maybe the only reason for cooperation. Moreover, the 
results show that organizations with world-wide presence cooperate at all steps of the 
value chain. However, cooperation can also be observed between smaller companies with 
viewer points of presence. Thus, world-wide presence cannot be considered a driver of 
cooperation.
Internal drivers of cooperation: The combination of complementary resources is an 
internal driver of cooperation which can be observed in almost all cooperation examples. 
Furthermore, cooperation can be observed more often if core competencies are not 
affected. At almost all assessed vertical cooperations core competencies of the partners 
were not affected. Moreover, cooperation at horizontal interfaces show overlapping core 
competencies more often. The definition of common goals is important in order to prevent 
competitive behavior in horizontal cooperation. This cooperation driver can be observed 
in almost all horizontal case studies. The results of the analysis do not indicate that the 
transfer of know-how is an important driver of cooperation in the telecommunication 
industry. Know-how development and transfer is an important driver of cooperation for 
research and development cooperation which can be observed between providers of end customer devices and network infrastructure suppliers. However, this interface is not 
within the scope of the assed case studies.
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
In this paper we proved that cooperation in the telecommunication industry can be 
classified with the proposed typology. Moreover, we showed that several examples can be 
found for all defined cooperation interfaces. The analysis showed that internal and 
external drivers of cooperation exist at all value added steps of the telecommunication 
value chain and that they differ with respect to the cooperation direction and the depth of 
added value. The combination of complementary resources has been identified as a driver 
of cooperation which can be observed at all value added steps of the value chain. 
Common goals and scarce resources are often drivers of horizontal cooperation. 
The focus of this paper is the assessment of drivers of cooperation which can be identified 
by a literature review. For this reason we did not incorporate internal drivers of 
cooperation like opportunism and bound rationality into the analysis. Thus, future research 
should consider these influences. Furthermore, the qualitative findings of this paper 
should be confirmed with empirical assessments. In this paper we proposed a broad 
definition for cooperative relationships. A cooperation definition which focuses on 
common investments which are shared ex-ante could possibly lead to different 
cooperation examples and results.   
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